material income while maintaining maximum protection of the highest echelons from prosecution (4).
Despite the fact that this definition does not exhibit more than a 'contingent empirical plausibility', it goes at least some way to testify that Russian specialists recognize the existence of the phenomenon, vaguely defined though it may be.
Confusion over the definition is rife among scholars of the Italian Mafia as well. D. Gambetta remarks that proper definitions are either dismissed as unnecessary or extremely capricious in the literature on the Italian Mafia: 'in one essay the Mafia is identified with everything criminal which happens in or below Naples; in another essay bandits, landowners and Mafiosi form an inextricable tangle; in yet another, the Mafia is identified with violent handling of the political tensions which affected Sicily soon after unification' (5). Amid such confusion, Christopher Duggan has reached the conclusion that the Mafia does not exist (6).
Unfortunately, the Mafia does exist, as magistrates, ordinary people and Mafiosi themselves in Sicily know only too well. Gambetta has provided a working definition of Mafia as 'one particular instance of an industry which supplies private protection' (7). Armed with this definition, he offers a model that is intended to explain the origin of the phenomenon in Sicily.
How the Mafia emerged in Sicily: a property rights approach
Gambetta has argued that 'the Mafia can be understood as a response to the lack of trust affecting Southern Italy and that endemic distrust is the crucial difference which explains why the Mafia did not emerge elsewhere in the Mediterranean world' (8). The lack of trust in the new Italian state produced a high potential demand for protection, and the Mafia supplied such protection to whomever wanted to buy it. Gambetta's argument is thus organized around a crucial distinction between a demand for protection and a supply of the same. Building on Leopoldo Franchetti, a nineteenth century Italian social scientist largely neglected among contemporary students of the Mafia, Gambetta regards the Mafia as a by-product of the end of feudalism and the beginning of a democratic society. The main effect of the demise of feudalism in Sicily was the transformation of land into a market commodity subject to legally defined individual property rights. Trading in land became conceivable in the South of Italy in the early nineteenth century. At the same time, vast extensions of both common and Church land were auctioned for the benefit of private purchasers (9). From 1812 to i860, the number of landowners of large estates in Sicily went from 2,000 to 20,000; from i860 to 1900, the number of hectares in private hands increased from 250,000 to 650,000 (10).
Gambetta subscribes to what we might call the 'property rights theory'. There is no single universally acceptable statement of the theory, but its essence may be summarized as follows: the existence of well-defined private property rights and their enforcement by the state is viewed as the basic precondition to the proper functioning of a market economy and its development. Well-defined property rights typically include the following three basic elements: 1) to every property is assigned a well-defined owner or owners with exclusive rights of ownership; 2) the owner of the property is the recipient of the residual income accruing to the assets; 3) the owner has the right to control or determine the use of the existing assets, to restructure the property and to sell or lease it (11).
That Sicily did not experience a smooth transition to the market economy is considered by Gambetta as a significant factor in the rise of the Mafia. Property rights-'an unprecedented novelty' in Sicilyproved 'difficult to enforce and [...] a source of constant strife' (12). The abolition of feudalism and the widespread introduction of private property rights greatly enhanced the demand for protection. However, the endemic distrust in Southern Italy in the ability or commitment of the state to clearly define and protect property rights produced a peculiar solution to the problem of protecting property. Protection did not undergo the customary process of centralization to become the monopoly of the state, but was supplied by autonomous suppliers, who were the ancestors of today's Mafiosi (13).
The absence of trust is only part of the explanation supplied by Gambetta for the growth of the Mafia. 'If trust is scarce, then it is reasonable to infer a high potential demand for protection. [...] Lack of trust implies simply that there will be more opportunities to meet that demand [for protection], and hence that meeting it will prove more profitable than elsewhere', but it does not necessarily follow that someone will do so (14). In fact, lack of trust remained uncompensated in various parts of Southern Italy and the Mediterranean world, such as in the village studied by Banfield (15). Elsewhere, a system of patronage developed, as in the town of Pisticci studied by Davies(i6). Gambetta offers evidence of the emergence of the supply of protection. He locates the emergence of the supply of private protection among the bravi released from baronial control at the crucial historical juncture that saw the end of feudalism and the birth of a democratic society. In Sicily, noble landlords maintained private armies of field guards, known as bravi, to protect their estates, to enforce their rights and to keep peasants in submission (17). One nobleman, for instance, is reported in 1750 as employing a 'company of twenty-four dragoons [...]' (18). In addition to the bravi, Sicily witnessed a long period of 'semi-private protection of public order', endorsed by the Bourbons, and that came to an end only in 1892 (19) .
Once the breakup of huge patrimonies occurred and the Italian state abolished these forms of semi-private policing and started by the end of the century to rely upon carabinieri and police officials, many professional protectors found themselves unemployed. Bravi, compagni, militi, disbanded soldiers of the Bourbon army and bandits 'began offering their services to classes other than the aristocracy. [...] Gradually those who succeeded as protectors became autonomous suppliers. Autonomy was the key element missing in other parts of the Mediterranean' (20). Franchetti, as early as 1876, wrote:
The villains, still ready to serve the purpose of others, have become self-employed, and their industry represents a new course of crimes which are far more numerous than those committed by the bravi of the previous era. Thus becoming more Gambetta's argument may be summarized as follows: 0) Once a monopoly over property exists, there is no scope for the emergence of private suppliers of protection. J) The end of monopoly over private property produces an increase in the number of people owning assets. 2) From (1) above it follows that the number of transactions in which individual agents with property rights engage will grow substantially. 3) From (2) above it follows that a demand for trust in whoever enforces property rights will emerge. 4) This demand will not necessarily be entirely met by the state, or at least not efficiently or not quickly enough. 5) From (4) above it follows that there will be scope for the private supply of protection as a substitute for trust. 6) A potential supply of private suppliers of protection is present (22).
It should be clear that some conditions are factual, while others are deductive. Namely, (2), (3) and (5) are deduced from (1), (2) and (4) respectively, rather than being a possible alternative between two courses. Other elements are not ineluctable and need to be established factually. It may well be, in fact, that the end of the monopoly over the means of production never takes place, as it would most probably have happened if the authors of the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union had been successful. Alternatively, once the transition to a market economy has started, the state might succeed in efficiently protecting property rights, as happened in England during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, or that a supply of private entrepreneurs of violence does not emerge, as in the cases studied by Banfield and Davies. The following figure may help to visualize the above points.
Gambetta's account of the emergence of the Mafia in Sicily thus disposes of the 'cultural' argument advanced both in Sicily and abroad to explain the rise of this very peculiar institution. According to The cultural argument may be refuted in another way. If another part of the world experiences the same conditions witnessed by Sicily in the nineteenth century and a Sicilian-like Mafia emerges, then Sicilian sub-cultural values will have been proved to be an unnecessary causal pre-requisite. This paper will explore the question of whether present-day Russia is such a place, thus pursuing a suggestion advanced by Gambetta himself (26). In the following sections we will explore to what extent the data so far available are consistent with Gambetta's model; whether, in other words, the future of Russia may be in some respect similar to the history of Sicily (27). The data supplied in section I point to the conclusion that organized criminal organizations proliferated after perestrojka. The monopoly over the means of production during Soviet times meant that autonomous suppliers of private protection did not emerge. Only the end of such a monopoly has set in place the first condition envisaged in Gambetta's model, namely, the spread of ownership and the increase in the number of people engaged in economic transactions. What a great number of observers labelled as Mafia-like activities in the pre-Gorbachev era were, in fact, instances of 'organized' corruption involving mainly top state officials.
Economic reforms from 1986 onward have produced a dramatic increase in the number of property owners and transactions in which individuals with property were involved, as documented in section II. The spread of property ownership has not been matched by clear property rights legislation and administrative or financial codes of practice. Nor has it been matched by a corresponding ability on the part of the authorities to enforce such legislation as does exist. The new Russian state has proved to be as riddled with corruption as the Soviet Union of the Gorbachev era. In addition, it has proved to be as inefficient in producing clear legislation and in protecting property rights. The new owners found themselves powerless. As a consequence, fear of losing property and vulnerability to frauds increased and so correspondingly did the demand for protection. An independent supply of potential 'protectors' has also appeared on the scene: an increasing number of dismissed officers and soldiers from the Army, the KGB and the police are looking for jobs and the only skill they possess is physical force. They perfectly qualify as autonomous private suppliers of protection. It seems to be the case that all the factual conditions of Gambetta's model do in fact apply to Russia today.
Having established that both a demand for and a supply of private protection is rising in Russia, I will turn to two instances where demand and supply met and I will argue that, in an untrusting world like present day Russia, it is highly rational to buy private protection, despite all the collective evils it produces. In such a world, suppliers of private protection-including Mafia groups-can only thrive. A general conclusion to be drawn is that a hasty transition to the market, in particular a transition which is not accompanied by clear property rights legislation and enforcement, may lead to disastrous consequences.
J. Serio has reported that officials in charge of combating organized crime estimate that four to five thousand criminal groups are active in the former Soviet Union.
The size of most groups ranges from 5 to 100 members. Some of the largest groups may have anywhere from 100 to 1,500 people and several specialized subunits within the organization. Until now, groups have existed for one-and-a-half to two years on average and committed 18-20 crimes per group. [...] According to official statistics, in 1987, 12,000 criminal groups displaying signs of organization were revealed and broken up, including 400 groups in Uzbekistan and Ukraine, 119 in Krasnodar territory, 29 in Moscow, and 21 in the Moscow region. As of January 1992, there were said to be some 80 organized groups in Moscow and St Petersburg alone. On average, every third group in the country had firearms, and three-quarters have motor vehicles at their disposal (28).
Soviet specialists claimed that organized criminal activity developed rapidly from 1986 onward. Criminal investigation teams exposed 2,600 groups and discovered around 50 'deeply conspiratorial' groups which had been operating for three or more years. During this time, they committed around 20,000 crimes including 218 murders, 785 armed assaults and 1,469 robberies (29).
The official data reported in table 1 indicate that the late eighties were the crucial years during which almost all groups started to operate.
Some groups are named after the territory they control (for instance, the group known as 'Solntsevo' hails from the Solntsevo region of Moscow); others after the ethnic background of the group's members (such as the 'Chechen', which consists of people originally from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic); other groups are known by the name or nickname of the group's leader (such as the 'Boris' Mafia) (30). According to Kommersant, there are ten major 'brigades' in Moscow, though some of these groups seem to be simply street gangs, while others appear to be ethnically homogeneous street beggars involved in petty crimes, such as the Gypsies (31). Though they are partial and diverse, the sources available so far point to the fact that the constellation of groups known as the Mafia emerged after 1985, following the introductions of the Gorbachev reforms, which allowed a private sector to emerge and, in particular, after the law on Co-operatives became operative (32). These data strongly support the model advanced in this paper. monopoly over private property is connected with the emergence of the Mafia and further evidence for this claim will be analyzed below. Nevertheless, this account would be incomplete without an exploration of the Russian scene prior to the end of the state monopoly over property. We need to first establish that a Mafia did not exist before the end of the Soviet Union; that is, before the end of the state monopoly over the means of production and economic transactions.
Private property in the Old Regime and the Soviet Union
In Russia the very concept of private property was unknown until it was introduced in the second half of the eighteenth century by the German-born Catherine II. Until then, the peculiar feature of Russian absolutism in its early form (which lasted from the fourteenth until the late eighteenth century) was marked by the virtual absence of the institution of private property. This type of regime has been known since the time of Hobbes as 'patrimonial' (33). Its distinguishing feature is the fusion of sovereignty and ownership; the monarch views himself, and is viewed by his subjects, as both the ruler of the realm and its proprietor. The patrimonial system rested on the assumption that there existed no separation between the properties of the ruler and those of the state. 'Russians failed to distinguish either in theory or in practice among three types of property: those belonging personally to the monarch; those belonging to the state; and those belonging to private citizens' (34).
The first attempt to separate royal from state lands in Russia was made by Paul I (1796-1801) who created a Department of Appanages in charge of the Romanov family properties. Under Nicholas I in 1826 this department was elevated to the status of a ministry (35). Until then, revenues flowing from the two types of property were pooled. Until then, too, Russian emperors felt perfectly at liberty to hand over or sell to private individuals vast tracts of state property (36). Richard Pipes has further argued that:
(33) R. PIPES, The Russian Revolution their accession. In the sixteenth century, it was i8gg-igig (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), further specified that the King's conquests 53-7.
were at his disposal for only ten years, after (34) In France, such a distinction appeared which they merged with the crown domains, The institution [of private property] came late to Russia, but once introduced it soon made itself thoroughly at home. While harassing its subjects for the slightest political offences, the imperial regime was very careful not to violate their property rights (37).
He quotes two rather telling instances as examples. Alexander Herzen never failed to receive his rents while abroad, despite being 'a powerful irritant to the authorities'; Lenin's mother continued to draw the government pension due to her as a civil servant's widow, despite having a son executed for an attempt on the tsar's life and two of her other children being jailed for revolutionary activities (38). Pipes argues that property rights were effectively enforced in Imperial Russia, and that no autonomous organization was more effective than the state in protecting property rights. The results of Pipes' research thus correspond with the argument advanced here, namely, that once a state is able to define and protect citizens' property rights, the chances of private protectors emerging to perform such a job are very dim. In fact, no Mafia is recorded as having emerged in Imperial Russia.
Private property was not abolished in the Soviet Union. One of the corner-stones of the Marxist programme was, of course, the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, but the abolition of ownership of individual property was never advocated. Marx and Engels stated in the Communist Manifesto:
The distinctive feature of Communism is, not the abolition of property in general, but the abolition of bourgeois property [...] We communists have been accused of wishing to abolish the property that has been acquired by personal exertion; the property that is supposed to be the foundation of individual liberty, activity and independence [...] We have no wish to abolish this personal appropriation of the product of labour, which is indispensable for the production of the immediate necessaries of life (39).
Soviet citizens were entitled to own items of personal property.
According to Article 10 of the Constitution:
The right of personal ownership by citizens of their income and savings from work, dwelling-house and subsidiary household husbandry, articles of domestic and everyday use, articles of personal consumption and convenience, as well as the right to inherit the personal property of citizens, shall be protected by law (40).
At first, the Soviet regime made some gestures toward abolishing inheritance rights, but soon reverted to a rather liberal policy. In 1926, a progressive inheritance tax, up to 90 % of the value of the estate, was substituted for a 10,000 ruble limitation. Since 1943, the government appropriated only a small fee, not to exceed 10 % of the value of the estate, for issuing an inheritance certificate. Thus, there was no limit on the amount which could be inherited in the USSR, and since some people earned very high incomes, fairly large properties could be bequeathed to heirs. The Soviet citizen could own and inherit property and money, have a bank account, a dwelling place and household equipment. Possession of dachas was also rather common among professionals (41). There is no evidence that the Soviet state failed to protect the property of personal items.
Criminal activities were of course widespread in the former Soviet Union, though they qualify as corruption rather than as Mafia. The Soviet economic system fuelled various forms of corruption. K. Simis noted that the Soviet 'underworld' was not ruled by gangsters and drug peddlers so much as by 'store and restaurant managers, and directors of state enterprises, institutions, and collective and state farms' and politicians (42). They mainly busied themselves with large-scale embezzlement from the state and with the diversion of goods from trade enterprises into their pockets. The common link among them was membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Membership of the CPSU was mandatory for anyone aspiring to gain an important position not only in the Party itself but also in the government apparatus. A list of acceptable candidates (nomenklatura) to fill the most important jobs was the vehicle for upward mobility of loyal Party members. The organizational structure of the Party and the state apparatus took the form of a huge hierarchical pyramid. At the base were the thousands of district secretaries and executives of the local government, heads of branches of KGB, MVD [Interior Ministry] and other organs. Above them were their counterparts at the regional level, making up the middle-level of the party state apparatus. At the summit of the pyramid were top functionaries of the Central Committee, the chairmen of the Council of Ministries, the deputies, members of the government, secretaries of the Party, as well as their counterparts at the level of each republic. At the very top, of course, sat the Politburo and the Secretary of CPSU (43).
The district elite supplied a constant stream of illegal tributes and gifts to regional centres. Each level of the political system extorted tributes from subordinate levels. 'Regional leaders bought a degree of autonomy from the centre and conducted local affairs in a way they saw fit as long as it did not encroach on the centre' (44). Under Khrushchev and to a greater extent Brezhnev, an era of unfettered corruption among the elite flourished. This era is epitomized by the exploits of Krasnodar Party boss Sergei Medunov who had run his whole region like one great commercial concession, [...] and the Uzbek cotton scandal, where a series of fictitious cotton harvests were used to swindle the state of three billion rubles and involved Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov (45).
Competition among groups within the state apparatus produced cracks in what Simis calls the 'corrupt society'. The Suslov-AndropovGorbachev axis was especially active in exposing corrupt officials and promoting inquiries, in open conflict with the group which rallied behind Brezhnev and Chernenko. Andropov, in particular, made use of a special KGB section which devoted itself to fighting against corruption. As is well known, this struggle went through various phases, and in the end Andropov managed to discredit Brezhnev's men and become General Secretary of the CPSU.
Corruption in the Soviet period is a different phenomenon from the Mafia as defined here. The coalitions of corrupt officials did not resort to structures outside the state apparatus in order to produce violent threats. They had to bargain with the army or police heads for their backing. Sometimes they used petty criminals to organize small traps for irritant figures: for instance, they set up compromising situations, photos were taken and then were used to blackmail antagonists (46). However, they did not create an alternative military structure. The Soviet Army and the various police branches of the state retained the monopoly over force and corrupt functionaries were able to use the state agencies for their purposes so long as their head had struck a deal with the police or army commander. The power of a Regional Party Secretary was almost absolute, and he could control the appointment and the careers of many cadres, including police officials, judges, Ministry of the Interior and KGB agents at the local level. Often, unwelcome investigations were hindered or never started. Some conventions to signal willingness to enter into the corruption scheme-such as accepting small gifts-emerged among the corrupt elite, and such coalitions lasted as long as they were mutually advantageous for their members. A ritual that could resemble in some ways the Mafia initiation ceremony did not exist to enjoin the Soviet bureaucrats.
There is another phenomenon which allows us to draw a clear distinction between Mafia and corruption, namely, the fact that Mafiosi do not commit suicide. As we have already mentioned, competing coalitions in the Soviet Union often used branches of the judiciary and the police apparatus to expose corrupt bureaucrats. Once exposed, the latter sometimes committed suicide, for reasons not dissimilar from the ones that led those Italians involved in the recently exposed corruption scandals of Tangentopoli (Bribesville) to choose a similar solution: they committed suicide out of shame, of fear of more severe sanctions (always possible according to the criminal code), or as an attempt to save their good name. In these cases, suicide occurs because the person has been caught deviating from the function he was supposed to perform on behalf of the community. On the other hand, a Mafioso who is arrested by the police is caught while performing his job, namely, engaging in a criminal activity. He has no reason to be ashamed. In fact, no cases have been recorded of Mafiosi committing suicide because they were caught by the police (47).
The widespread corruption fostered a black market where a variety of goods was exchanged. Different regions of the USSR experienced this in different degrees, Georgia being a region in which black market activities were notably extensive. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this is the underground Georgian millionaire Babunashvili, who was able to procure for himself the post of Minister of Light Industry. Furthermore, every major enterprise had its tolkach (fixer) whose job was to navigate the channels of the shadow economy and pilot the complex series of deals and undertakings necessary to operate in the Brezhnev era. Deals were also made with other enterprises. Nevertheless, the black economy did not operate independently from the state apparatus: state officials retained control over enforcement agencies as well as production. In this respect, they closely resembled the Sicilian landlords of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, rather than the little property owners of the late nineteenth century. In the pre-(47) There are altogether very few cases of murder of Giovanni Falcone, killed himself Italian Mafiosi who committed suicide. They (Repubblica, 3/V111/1993. I am grateful to V. usually do so in order to signal to their 'family' Pizzini for bringing this article to my attention that they did not give away the secrets they and for an enlightening discussion on this knew or to protect relatives. Recently, A. Gioe, point). In a letter he left behind, he explicitly a Mafioso from Altofonte investigated for the urote he did not regret his various deeds.
Gorbachev Soviet Union, independent agencies powerful enough to supply protection more efficiently than the state did not exist.
II

Spread of ovmership
A crucial distinction must be drawn between property ownership prior to the Gorbachev period and from 1986 onwards. By 1992, a Western journalist provided the following vivid account of this new situation. The percentage of private firms involved in Russian industrial production rose to 14 % of the total in 1991, though the value of their fixed capital was only 4 % of the total. Small and medium private enterprises jumped from 20,000 to more than 50,000 in the first months of 1992, when the first wave of the privatisation programme hit Russia. In 1992, 33,000 small-scale state enterprises were privatized (50).
Partly influenced by the Polish and Czechoslovak examples, the Presidential decree on privatisation, promulgated on 29 December 1991 (decree no. 341), put most small enterprises into the category of 'obligatory privatisation'. Auctions of state assets took place in many parts of Russia (51). By February 1992, 50,000 agricultural firms, 9,000 companies, 1,300 commercial banks and n o commodity exchanges had been officially registered (52). In 1993, the number of privatised enterprises has reached 82,000 units and between 700 and 800 medium and large enterprises are still being auctioned off every month (53). In all of Russia 30,000 small and large shops have been privatized, of which 9,399 were in Moscow. Between January and April 1993, 2.5 million apartments or houses were privatized, bringing the total to 5,300,000. By May 1, 1993, 16% of all flats were privately owned, and the government forecasts that by the end of the year the figure will be 40 % of the total (54). The third wave of the privatisation programme is about to hit Russian industry. According to the Russian Government's plans, by the end of 1993 up to one third of the entire value of Russia's productive capital will be privatized and the projected figure for 1994 is to be about 50 % (55). Land is slowly but steadily being freed from the bonds of state ownership. By January 1993, 49,770 private peasant farms were operating in the Russian Federation (56). The President's decree on the Regulation of Land Relations and the development of Agrarian Reform in Russia, which enhanced the ownership of land (57), was published in October 1993 and it is supposed to implement the right to own and sell land, which is enshrined in the newly adopted Constitution (58).
That the reforms generated by Gorbachev and Yeltsin constitute a radical change in approach from what had come before can be illustrated by the enactment of a Law on Inventions in the USSR, approved on 31 May, 1991, which came into force on 1 July, 1991 (59). The key provision in regard to registered inventions was that inventors would have exclusive right of use (as in most Western patent laws), and therefore could sell or license such rights of use over the invention to others. This was a major departure from the old 'inventors' certificate' regime, in which inventions were treated as public property and inventors had no right to restrict or monopolize their use. One could say that the traditional socialist system amounted to a giant company suggestion scheme, in which the USSR, Inc. exercised a monopolist's power to set the terms of any reward to inventors (60). The effect of this new law was to further undermine state monopoly and to spread ownership (61). The above discussion of the various data relating to property ownership has attempted to show that conditions in today's Russia are congruent with propositions (i) and (2) of Gambetta's model. These propositions can be captured in the statement that the end of the monopoly over the means of production and commerce increased the number of people owning assets and their involvement in economic transactions.
Demand of protection
Proposition (3) of Gambetta's model is inferred from (2), namely, a demand for trust in whoever enforces property rights will emerge after the spread of property. In this section we will attempt to establish whether such a demand for trust and protection of one's property was met by the Soviet and Russian state (62).
Whether a state protects property rights efficiently depends to a great extent on whether such rights are clearly defined. In Russia the increase in property owners and economic transactions was not matched by clear property rights legislation. For a number of years property regulations were a mixture of procedures from the previous regime, which were heavily influenced by socialist doctrine in matters of property, and new regulations. In a paper on reform priorities, Rudiger Dornbusch observed that Among the key elements [of a smooth transition to market economy] is a functioning legal system that protects the right to conduct economic transactions and provides the possibility of sanctions and redress (63).
He then goes on to argue that the most suitable way of handling this issue is to 'adopt wholesale and without question the entire civil code, including corporate law, of a well-functioning legal system, say the Netherlands or Finland' (64). This is hardly a viable suggestion, and in fact the Soviet Union and the newly independent republics did not take up this advice. Since late 1989, Soviet policy-makers have put forward a number of laws, statutes, decrees and presidential edicts that were intended to create the legal framework for a Western type mixed 1992 economy. They dealt, among other things, with joint stock companies, small firms, security transactions and banks. An important step toward the full-scale extension of property rights came in 19 November, 1986, with the adoption of the Law on Individual Labour Activity (that went into effect in May 1987). This Law laid the ground for the potential development of business organizations that were not simply individual enterprises or even small scale family businesses, but also businesses that could be made up of people not related to each other. These businesses, along with their assets, would be owned by the members of the cooperative. While the law permitted a wide range of activities, authorities were given the power to decide for themselves what should or should not be allowed and ultimate power to give or deny permission to operate an individual business (65).
Since 1986, the legal situation in Russia has developed in a chaotic fashion. A plethora of often overlapping and conflicting laws and decrees emanates from a variety of jurisdictions. 'The same subjects are often covered by many different and mutually contradictory normative pronouncements, and it is difficult to ascertain their ultimate validity' (66). Naishul' has shown that the weakening of vertical hierarchical links and the collapse of the party destroyed the former network of administrative coordination. State authority has been transformed into 'a system of autonomous administrative offices with overlapping jurisdictions, each pursuing its own rather than the general state interests' (67). The privatized state industries are thus subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty, as pointed out by a commentator: 'at the heart of the debate [over the newly privatized enterprises] is the uncertainty about the nature of the property rights that have notionally been transferred from the state to shareholders' (68). The same verdict applies to the legal status of land and flats. 'If Russian law is a sea of uncertainty, nowhere the waters are murkier than around questions of ownership. And in practice, the most energetic battles are over who owns a particular building or piece of land' (69). Tax regulations are also The absence of a copyright law has either fostered piracy or withholding of investment, or both. A case in point is that of the Russian publisher of Scarlet, the sequel to Gone With the Wind by Alexandra Ripley. Despite having legally purchased the right to publish Scarlet in Russia, the Muscovite publisher abandoned the book's distribution, because Moscow was flooded by unauthorized versions of the book published by more than ten Russian publishers, and he could not find a legal way to stop others publishing the Ripley's sequel (73). Finally, the Russian Government approved a Law on Copyright and Related Rights on 25 January 1993(74). The law itself provides for a 'transitional period' (which will end on 1 January 1994) during which users have the right to use, for example, computer software and data banks without the author's consent and without paying compensation. '[In Russia] piracy of all types of intellectual property, and indeed in the other countries of the cis, is the rule rather than the exception [...] and the actual enforcement of the law may prove very difficult' (75). Even the officials involved in the drafting of the law and its enforcement reckon that, at best, piracy would fall from more than 90 % to 60 % during the next four to five years (76). According to expert estimates, up to 95 % of the computer software distributed in the former Soviet Union is pirated (77).
As The Russian state has not only proved itself unable to produce clear property rights legislation, but is increasingly lagging behind in the protection of its own citizens' lives, a feature that further debases trust in it. According to official statistics, the 'serious crime' rate has increased 32 % in one year alone (1989), while the average Soviet citizen was in 1989 four to five times more likely then a Briton, Frenchman or Japanese to die a violent death (79). Although the detention rate increased 7 % in the first quarter of 1990 compared with the same period in 1989 (and by 16.3 % in the case of serious crime), the overall crime rate rose 15.3% during the first three months of 1990(80). Demands on the police are increasingly burdensome and dangerous: in 1989, policemen used firearms 3,891 times (almost four times the figure for 1988) and more than 350 MVD officers were killed in the course of their duties (81). General, said that his office is in a position to complete no more than 50 % of the bills of indictments in the already investigated cases (83). It has become dangerous to walk even in the most central streets of Moscow (84). These data match growing concerns over personal safety related to the rising number of kidnappings reported in the Russian press (85). Collective panic spread in 1992, when bottles of paralysing gas against thieves could be bought everywhere in Moscow (86). L. Shelley, an expert on Soviet and post-Soviet crime, has concluded that 'the crime increase of the final years of the Soviet period [...] did not represent the continuation of a trend'. Instead, it was a 'new phenomenon' (87).
Russian crime rates ig8g-igg2
The absence of a credible state, which provides rights and enforces them, undermines not only trust in the state, but also among citizens. The business community has so far not developed a set of rules of the game which holds in the absence of an enforcing central agency. There is, in fact, a high rate of crimes committed by business people against other business people. A number of cases have been reported in which the arrested criminals were members of trade and purchasing cooperatives with ambitions to rid themselves of their competitors, employing guns and explosives. 'Competition here means that you grasp the throat of your competitor and beat money out of him', says Sergei Siderenko, chief of the St Petersburg's special anti-Mafia unit (88). Of more than 5,000 private retail outlets that were reported as operating in Moscow in 1991, 8 0 % do not have elementary security systems. Vladimir Novikov, of the Moscow Criminal Police Department, told the weekly Golos that the privatisation of retail trade that started in 1991 has led to a dramatic increase in theft, armed robbery and murder (89).
Both self-declared Mafiosi and law enforcers in Russia seem to agree on the fact that the state is not a credible protector of individual property and safety (90). According to an anonymous Mafioso interviewed proposed an amendment to the criminal code that would abrogate the legal concept of proportionate self-defence. In the Soviet Criminal Code, as in most criminal codes in the world, the notion authorised citizens to defend themselves in ways proportionate to the threat. According to Stepankov, If an individual is trying to defend himself, his life or his properties, then he is entitled to use any means and we should not ask wether he is going beyond the limits set by the concept of proportionate self-defence (91).
Stepankov's proposal has been included in the new draft of the Criminal Code, which has already been signed by the President and awaits final approval from the newly elected Federal Assembly (92).
The demand for protection is quickly growing in Russia. Following the January 1992 price deregulation, private farmers in the Kemerovo region, Siberia, have seen many armed visitors to their farmsteads take away their cattle and poultry. The local racketeers have told the farmers they will leave them alone provided that they receive a monthly 'protection sum' of 5,000 rubles. 'Those guys carry grandfather's hunting rifles, they tote army submachine guns, and I would feel much better off if I had a machine gun in my house', one farmer told a Kuranty reporter. Siberian farmers have asked their local associations to buy appealed to foreign police to assist them (L. thing to persecute economic crimes, because it SHELLEY, Post-Soviet Organized Crime: cannot apply old Soviet laws which referred to Implications for the development of Soviet sue-socialist property'. Corriere della Sera, 12/ cessor states and foreign countries, Mimeo, 1993, 11/1993. 14-5). The FBI is to open an office in Moscow (92) A further relevant novelty of the new (Paddy Rawlinson, personal communication).
Criminal Code concerns the collective re-(91) Stepankov also notes that the Russian sponsibility of members of organized criminal penal code does not take into account econgroups. See Moscow News, 3/XI1/1993. omic crimes. 'Russian justice cannot do any-them firearms (93). Farmers have to protect not only their cattle, poultry and the expensive farm machinery from occasional thieves, but also the right to cultivate their own plot from collective state farmers who have not embraced the new framework of individual private property in land. In an interview with one of the first private farmers-Mr. Sergei Boyakov, owner of 228 hectares of land in Russia's rich southern Penza region-it was reported that he was plagued by the problem of persuading state farmers to keep their cows off his pastures and, despairing of a negotiated settlement, has decided to hire private police to guard his fields (94).
Fear has spread among farmers across the Federation. During the Russian Farmers' Congress held in Moscow in early February of 1992, a major concern voiced by the delegates regarded protection of property, and Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar promised that they would be allowed to carry firearms to protect crops (95). Private farmers in the Cheliabinsk Region, the Urals, have been allowed to carry shotguns for the protection of their lives and property after the Ural Farmer, an association of private farmers, pressed the police to give such permission in the aftermath of a spate of crimes against rural households. Under an agreement with the association, the police have also said that they are ready to provide farmers with patrols to protect them from attacks on their property (96). According to the Minister of the Interior, there are more than 1.5 million firearms possessed illegally by the population (97).
The data supplied above seem to indicate that present-day Russia is a potentially rich pasture for suppliers of private protection.
Supply of protection
So far we have explored the issue of whether there is a potential demand for protection. It cannot, however, be argued that demand is going to be met inevitably, otherwise we will yield to a functionalist reasoning. Lack of protection implies that there will be more opportunities to meet that demand, and hence that meeting it will be more profitable than elsewhere. But it does not follow that a Mafia-like solution will arise inevitably. Together with the demand for protection, it is essential to provide some coherent idea of the origin of its supply (condition (6) in Gambetta's model). In what follows we will assess the independent evidence that points to the presence of a considerable number of potential private suppliers of protection. The supply of private protection usually derives from few specific sources. Vigilantes, ex-soldiers, private guards, bandits, prison inmates, as well as some individuals with spontaneous aptitude, provide a pool of potential suppliers already trained in the use of violence (98). It has been estimated that in the span of three years-from 1987 to 1989-economic reform was responsible for 3 million people losing their jobs in industry, only 20 % of whom were offered suitable alternative employment (99). Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin stated that unemployment in Russia currently stands at 4.5 million (100). Among the newly unemployed, it is not uncommon to find people trained in or accustomed to the use of violence.
A number of servicemen have now been made 'redundant', due either to economic structures of the Russian state or to dismissal for offences ranging from corruption to abuse of authority. At the end of January 1992, Viktor Barannikov, chief of Russia's security service, announced a cut of staff from 36,000 to 2,800, a reduction unprecedented in KGB history. Those retired include chauffeurs, medical personnel, highly skilled specialists (in particular 'code crackers' and experts in computer security), who, according to Kommersant, are already being courted by Western security agents (101). 25,000 officers of the former Soviet Army have been fired on political grounds. The Russian Defence Ministry's press services stated on 2 February 1993 that the programme for the gradual reduction of Russian armed forces' numerical strength will result in an annual discharge of between 40,000 to 50,000 officers (102).
A series of dismissals has affected the police as well. This is due not so much to an effort to cut down the number of officers (the police are in fact trying to expand their ranks), but to reduce corruption and slop- piness(iO3). In 1988 alone, for example, 1,500 policemen were convicted for offences ranging from negligence to abuse of authority. Following a major investigation conducted in 1987-88, 25,000 policemen were discharged on various grounds, and a further 32,000 were dismissed in 1989 (in 1990 it was estimated that there was a total of 475,000 personnel in the police as a whole) (104). The police are finding it difficult to attract quality personnel, 'particularly given the new opportunities to earn considerably more as bodyguards and private investigators' (105). To organize an efficient firm providing a private supply of protection, it is necessary to have not only a labour supply, but also a minimal level of equipment, most importantly weapons. Lack of morale and pressing economic problems have pushed many members of security services and the army to sell a considerable amount of weapons on the black market. According to Gennadi Deinega, of the St Petersburg police investigation department, the local firearms black market offers for the most part weapons stolen from the army, KGB and police units. Since 1989 in St Petersburg alone 45 pieces of firearms have been registered as 'unaccounted for' by police and KGB officers. Another significant source is the so-called 'conversion business'. Warrant officers at military warehouses often sell stolen weapons on the black market that are later listed as 'written off and destroyed' (111).
Economically pressed army soldiers and officers are not the only suppliers. A steady flow of weapons also comes from 'amateur manufactures' ('Any turner who has the basic skills can make handguns', says Deinega) as well as the so-called 'diggers', those who looked for and collected wwn weapons. Prices are not extremely high given the current situation: at the St Petersburg Sennoy market, hand-guns are priced between 3,000 and 10,000 rubles, while a submachine gun goes for 100,000 rubles. According to Deinega, the same amount of governmental effort which goes into combating the illicit flow of drugs should be devoted to combating the vast firearms black market (112).
When supply and demand meet
So far, we have been trying to establish whether the conditions of Gambetta's model, outlined at the beginning, obtain in Russia. In the following sections, we are going to look at some solutions to the problem of private protection, i.e. at some instances where the demand for protection met its supply. We envisage two different solutions to the problem of protection: 1) the 'internalizing' solution: an entrepreneur produces protection only for himself. (Protection is private and each supplier has himself as the only customer). 2) the 'Sicilian' solution: autonomous suppliers sell protection to selected customers. 
Internalizing protection
Internalizing protection is a solution to the problem we have been dealing with so far. It amounts to being a thug or hiring a number of thugs on a permanent basis, who will perform a variety of tasks, such as making sure partners comply with the terms of an agreement, obtaining credits and punishing non-payers. The absence of a clear legal framework and of a credible state able to enforce laws and contracts has led a number of business people in Russia to resort to firepower. According to a police officer, 'now every respectable man from the business world deems it necessary to hire several armed bodyguards or at least to buy a weapon on the black market'(113). A recent investigative newspaper article reported that 'the accumulated firepower available in Russia is being employed more and more often by seemingly respectable businessmen as a last argument in settling property and financial disputes'(114). For instance, a guard of the Most company shot a member of another commercial set-up, Bayazet, during an argument over office space (115).
One company that seems to have internalized protection is Top, a commercial enterprise based in Moscow, which has been defined as a 'criminal-commercial organization' by a MVD officer (116). In addition to the legitimate sphere of operation, which was the 'nerve centre of the entire organization', it developed two detachments of 'fighters', one of them headed by a known criminal and the other by the commercial director of a small business venture named Spetsstroi. Strong-arm tactics were used to win advantageous deals, punish non-payers, obtain credits and settle scores with rivals (117). Letting an army of thugs sit idle for most of the day, however, amounts to a waste of resources. In fact, the Top thugs, in addition to protecting Top, developed their own network of extortionist and protective activities which brought them to the attention of the police. They began to demand protection money from newly-opened shops in a peripheral district of Moscow. The 'protection department' of Top slowly emerged as a new business in itself, not just as a subsidiary. In fact, a two-stage pattern may emerge in a business that has internalized protection: first, if disputes arise between the legal business people and the 'fighters', the latter are more likely to win the argument, since they can be extremely intimidating; secondly, the legal side of the firm may tend to rely more on threats of violence and less on quality and price to keep its customers and partners. This implies that the production of efficient threats may eventually become the core business activity of the company and the 'fighters' will expand their role in the company. A possible transformation may then occur: a firm that has internalized protection may either split into two or evolve into one that specializes in selling protection only (i 18).
Autonomous suppliers
We now turn to instances of the solution to the demand for protection which bear crucial similarities to the solution which emerged last century in Sicily. In such instances, protection is a commodity sold on the market by autonomous suppliers. The first of such suppliers we encounter is the state itself, the agency that by definition should precisely do the opposite. The Interior Ministry issued an order allowing local Soviet policemen to enter into contracts with the cooperatives to provide security services for commercial establishments. In 1989 contracts totalling 600,000 rubles for such services were signed by the Moscow militia. The head of the MVD even suggested that policemen might form private cooperatives which would be supervised by their own department (119). The Ministry itself thus encourages private-not universal-protection.
It may be the case that the Ministry has not considered a perverse by-product of providing protection only to some commercial outlets.
(118) This is not, however, the only poss-
The Assuming that selective police protection is effective, thieves will be deterred from stealing from the places which enjoy the extra police protection, if such outlets are clearly signposted. This means however that unprotected agents can be easily identified by default and crime will tend to be more concentrated there. Since protection is selective, it will be easier to spot the unprotected enterprises and target them (120). The choice for the entrepreneurs was between paying for the extra police protection or being exposed to greater danger. Not only is the basic right to security effectively abandoned as a universal right, but also the effect of such a policy is to shift the burden of crime onto the segment of the public which does not pay the extra fee to the police officers. Privately distributed police supervision need not be the most efficient or welcomed form of protection. In Moscow, many owners of commercial outlets were offered extra police protection at a price. They were in no hurry to take up this opportunity, despite the dramatic rise in thefts, armed robbery and murder targeting the thousands of retail outlets that have sprung up in Moscow in the recent past (121). Lack of confidence in the efficiency of the service could be a good reason not to buy protection from the police. Vladimir Novikov, of the Moscow Criminal Police department, has suggested another possible explanation, which would not stain the reputation of the militia: the reason why business people do not accept the extra services offered by the police is that many are themselves involved in the widespread activity of selling stolen goods (122). Cooperatives which obtained their supplies illegally would not turn to the state to secure their property rights, but to private suppliers. Indeed, only a private protector would do.
The streets of Moscow offer various insights into the reasons that may push sellers to buy private protection from autonomous suppliers. A sophisticated street code has emerged by which valued selling spots are rented out by what we call a 'traffic agent'. Sellers of homogeneous goods tend to cluster together and/or prefer certain spots to others. 'Those selling hardware have begun to gather outside the government hardware stores. Children's goods sell best outside children stores' (123). McDonald's is surprisingly small: not more than five or six. The area is far from being chaotic and customers can easily buy the merchandise. This is strikingly different from the street nearby, where it is almost impossible to walk on the sidewalk, due to the large number of sellers of petty commodities. Near McDonald's, an invisible traffic agent 'rents out' public space (124). The agent assures the seller that no one will trespass on his pitch and that the business environment will not be a chaotic one. It would seem rational for the traffic agent to rent out as many places as possible. At the end of the day, he would make more money. Nevertheless, if he is to provide effective protection, the more people he is protecting, the more difficult it will be to collect the fees and to assure general safety for all. In fact, it is in the traffic agent's best interest to protect the street sellers as efficiently as possible, because his daily income and reputation as a supplier of protection depends on the seller earning a sum and not being robbed. In order to do so, it makes sense for him to have a limited amount of customers as opposed to an unmanageable number. Moreover, the more people he protects, the higher the risk of attracting free-riders, who do not pay the fee but enjoy his protection (125) .
The rights that people have over assets-or places-are not constant in the streets of Moscow; they are a function of their own direct effort at protection, of the competition posed by other people's attempts to capture those assets, and of police or other agents' protection (126). In the instance we just described of places outside McDonald's, agents other than the police protect the rights of street sellers. In addition to the protection of assets and earnings, those who pay protection money are assured that a high barrier to newcomers is put up by the protection agents. The sale is far from being a mad scrimmage (127).
Commerce has been closely followed by the emergence of protection agents. In the following, we will take a closer look at an instance of private protection supplied by an autonomous supplier. Zhenya Belova, 12, and Nadya Nekrasova, 13, are two young entrepreneurs involved in washing car windscreens at the crossing outside Kropotkinskaya subway station. The idea to take up such a trade came from reading about 'fantastic money' car washers make in the children's paper Pionerskaya Pravda. They bought spray cans for washing car windscreens, procured some rags, pressed into service Nadya's little sister Varya and started working.
The traffic lights there change slowly and you can wash more cars. Only we have to pay protection money to bigger boys. One is called Dude. We pay him a tenner first thing and then pocket all we can earn during the day. He makes sure adults don't take our money away and chases off competition. Further down the road two boys work at the crossing next to the embankment. They pay the traffic police there 25 rubles for each hundred they earn. They do not bother us because Dude makes a deal with them (128).
The story told by Nadya shows that protection agents do provide a service to sellers in post-communist Russia. Dude performs a number of tasks for which the two girls compensate him. Dude fends off competitors and thieves. He does not offer a public good in the same way as a light-house keeper does. He does not make the world more secure for everybody. He chooses two customers of the commodity protection at the expense of others and he has found a way to make them pay for it. This instance helps to dispose of the commonly held view that the protection agents offer protection only from the dangers they create. Dude imposes on Nadya and Zhenya an extra cost, though he makes sure that no one else will start competing with them in the same area (129). The two girls pay him to avoid competing with other sellers that may prove to be more efficient than they are (130).
It is in Dude's interest to protect only a few at the expense of others. The greater the number of agents Dude protects, the higher the chance of disputes arising among them. The Mafioso would then be constantly called to settle disputes, some of which might prove hard to resolve. Some of his customers could end up feeling insufficiently protected and further conflict would arise, including the possibility of new Mafioso offering a better deal to the dissatisfied. Dude performs an additional task. In the absence of Dude, Nadya, Zhenya and Varya would be truly at risk; for instance, they might come under the investigation of the police (if for nothing else, for not paying any sort of taxes). Alternatively, they are in danger of being robbed, or of being forced by some customers to provide services they are not willing to supply.
We meet different people, of course. One day a green car pulled up and the driver said: 'You want to make some money, girls?' 'Shall we wash your car?' 'No-he it is a harmful one: sellers compete not by (129) D. GAMBETTA, The Sicilian Mafia, improving quality or reducing prices but by 22-24.
buying or developing internally more efficient (130) Nonetheless, a form of competition violent skills, arises in a market protected by the Mafia, and once and asked me to pay them 500 a month. I paid up. Now they have disappeared for some reason'. This is the reason why the police were after him so much: nobody protected him. Alexander paid a gang which proved to be a fly-by-night protection agency. They proved to be an unreliable source of protection. They were phony Mafiosi. This illustrates that a seller needs to do more than just pay money to the first gang that happens to pass by, in order to enjoy sound protection (133) .
The payment of protection money was already a widespread phenomenon in the last years of the Soviet regime, after private cooperatives were legalized. Estimates suggest that 75 % of Moscow's cooperatives and 90 % of Leningrad's cooperatives made such payments. Racketeers could often determine the size of their demands from exact figures about the cooperative incomes based on information they obtained from the local Soviets for a fee. In 1988, there were more than 6,000 reported cases of racketeering; of these, in almost half the cases (2,800), the demand was for 500 rubles. In 535 cases it was for about 1,000 rubles, and in 928 instances, protectors tried to extort more than 1,000 rubles. Sometimes racketeers expected their extortion money to be a fixed percentage (usually 30%) of the cooperative income (134). These data support the analytical distinction between 'predatory' and 'sensible' protection. The majority of racketeers' demands were clustered around the 500 rubles' level, an amount of money which we take to be the 'sensible' one, while others asked for exorbitant sums. Mafiosi who take a long term view and expect to remain in business for a lengthy amount of time are less likely to charge predatory prices for fear of risking future income. Otherwise, if the temporal horizon of the protection agent is uncertain and short, he will be more likely, ceteris paribus, to charge extortionate prices (135).
Conclusions
Russia is undergoing a transition to the market which is in some crucial respects similar to the one experienced by Sicily last century. The spread of property has not been matched by clear property rights legislation, administrative or financial codes of practice and, further, authorities seem ill-equipped to enforce them where they exist. Such a situation reduces trust in the state and fosters a demand for alternative sources of protection. We have analyzed cases where entrepreneurs either internalize protection or buy it from a private supplier, and the price paid has a rational justification in their world. Internalizing protection may not be a stable solution, though definite empirical evidence to this effect is not yet available. A business that internalises protection may-under certain conditions-specialize in the production of protection only.
Demand need not always find its supply, otherwise we will yield to a functionalist reasoning. As a matter of fact, in parts of Southern Italy private protectors were not always there to take up the opportunities opened up by the demand for protection at the time of feudalism's demise, as shown by Banfield and Davies. Most probably, not all parts of Russia will find the same solution to protection. Demand for protection, by itself, is not sufficient to give rise to autonomous suppliers of protection. Other factors play a role.
The other central factor is the presence of a supply of individuals trained in the use of violence who suddenly find themselves unemployed, such as the disbanded army soldiers, the bravi and the bandits in Sicily, or the growing Violent' proletariat in Russia, made up of former KGB, army and police officers and criminals taking up new opportunities. Though such a supply may not be the only factor that explains the emergence of a Mafia, it does have an important role. These findings produce rather disquieting thoughts on the nature of the transition that Russia is experiencing. It appears that the Russian state is not able to produce the basic goods and services which are associated with the definition, enforcement and protection of property rights. These are not minor failings. If such failings are not given the utmost attention and eventually overcome, Sicily is a reminder to Russians of the path they are likely to go down.
